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The End of the Cold War and  
US-EU-Relations 
Introduction 
We begin with a version of our preferred theoretical approach of Political 
Culture
1 applying it to U.S. foreign policy formulation on the one hand, and 
the nascent European Union Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP) 
as well as its most recent “Rapid Reaction Force” (RRF) developments on 
the other. We also suggest that the modern nation-state is one form of eth-
nocentrism, which arises from a primordial human urge to live together as 
social animals in Aristotle’s terminology. We suggest that the nation-state 
is only one of many theoretically possible forms of ethnocentrism, as 
“weak” or “failed” states and empires also exist. We see the modern “na-
tion” as the creation of the modern state and not vice versa. We are there-
fore of the “modernist” school which differs from the primordialist and 
perennialist schools of thought in that modern nations as forms of social 
cohesion are by no means a matter of historical necessity. Some form of 
 
1  See Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” Interna-
tional Studies Review (vol. 4, issue 3), fall, 2003, pp. 87-113. For an interesting 
book review analyzing the role of political culture and other forms of political and 
economic development in the ex-Soviet world, cf. Troy McGrath, “From Commu-
nism to Capitalism: Liberalization, Learning, and the Long Road,” ibid., pp. 167-
179. For an interesting application of “Political Culture” to recent US foreign pol-
icy, cf. Ch. 8, “Americans’ Values, Beliefs, and Preferences: Political Culture and 
Public Opinion in [US-GC] Foreign Policy,” in Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. 
Kegley, Jr., & James M. Scott, American Foreign Policy (Thomson/Wadsworth), 
2003, 6
th Ed., especially pp. 248-250. Glen D. Camp 
social cohesion larger than the family is in our view a matter of historical 
necessity, but the nation-state is the form which actually dominates. Thus 
even though nations are “natural” in the sense of fulfilling the historical 
human need for some form of social cohesion transcending the family, they 
are not “inevitable” in our view. Again, this issue lies beyond the specific 
purview of our paper. But a brief review of the work of theorists of nation 
formation and in the case of the European Union, supranational entity for-
mation, is fundamental to understanding our paper.
2 
Walter Lippmann notes in chapter two of his  classic, U.S. Foreign Policy
3  
 
“The fundamental principle of a foreign policy”:  
“The thesis of this book is that a foreign policy consists in bringing into bal-
ance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commit-
2  A useful review of this difficult topic is found in Vojin Rakic, “Theories of Nation 
Formation and Case Selection: The Meaning of an Alternative Model” in Nationali-
ties Papers, vol. 26, no. 4 (1998), pp. 599-613. In this comparison of various theo-
ries, Rakic considers inter alia the differing views of Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities (London: Verso), 1983; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard), 1960; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell), 1983; Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan), 
1945; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell), 1986 
and Pierre Van den Berghe, Race and Ethnicity (New York: Basic Books, 1970. 
    Although a discussion of political culture as the basis of foreign and domestic 
policy is also outside the purview of this paper, a few bibliographical citations may 
be appropriate. Basing their views on Almond and Verba’s study of five cultures 
published in 1963 (Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Politi-
cal Attitudes in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.), 1965); Almond and 
Powell argue, “A political culture is a particular distribution of political attitudes, 
values, feelings, information and skills.” Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell 
Jr., (eds.), 3
rd Ed. Comparative Politics Today: A World View (Glenview, Illinois: 
Scott, Foresman, 1984), p. 37b. Based on rather sophisticated statistical longitudinal 
studies, Inglehart concludes that Almond and Verba were right… and enduring 
cross-cultural differences [between countries-GC] exist and can be measured and 
further that “political culture is a crucial link between economic development and 
democracy.” (Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” American 
Political Science Review, December, 1988, pp. 1204-1219, passim. See also an un-
published MS by Glen D. Camp, “Political Culturalist Explanations and the East 
European ‘Sea Change’: Is a Predictive or Explanatory Model Possible?” prepared 
for the New England Studies Association, 04/13/91.  
3 Walter  Lippmann,  U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (NY: Pocket Books, 
1943), pp. 6-7 [bolding and ital. added-GC]. 
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ments and the nation’s power… The statesman of a strong country may balance 
its commitments at a high level or at a low, but whether he is conducting the 
affairs of Germany, which has had dynamic ambitions, or the affairs of Swit-
zerland, which seeks only to hold what it already has, or of the United States, 
he must still bring his ends and means into balance. If he does not, he will fol-
low a course that leads to disaster. “(ital. added-GC) 
In sum, Lippmann argues that a prudent foreign policy requires that na-
tional foreign policy ends must be tailored to national means, i.e., means 
and ends must be in balance. The temptation by an activist U.S. administra-
tion is usually to “bite off more than it can comfortably chew”-regardless 
of the moral issues involved-as in Vietnam and perhaps in Iraq. This leads 
to our first problem: has the US in its recent foreign policy, via its own ex-
penditures and “side payments” made to its various allies, engaged in     
“imperial overstretch”? Or is it strong enough, wise enough, and effective 
enough to handle both domestic and foreign commitments?
4 Paul Kennedy 
argues for “imperial overstretch”
5 Other students of current US policy, 
while demanding strong US support for coalition partners such as the EU 
and NATO, deny any relative decline in US power. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., for 
example, denies the probability of “a Roman fate for the United States” 
(i.e., collapse from internal ‘rot’: “I will show that at the beginning of the 
 
4  Side payments are described and analyzed in William H. Riker, The Theory of Po-
litical Coalitions (New Haven/London, 1962), pp. 105-106, pp. 115-20, and pp. 
120-123. For Riker’s putative limits on side payments, cf. p. 129.  
5  Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power, Why the World’s only Super-
power Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), p. 112. On the U.S. in 
relative decline, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Eco-
nomic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (NY: Vintage Books, 
1987), pp. 514-535, “The United States: The Problem of Number One in Relative 
Decline.” For Kennedy’s theory of “imperial overstretch” and the concomitant 
problem of relating commitments to resources noted by Lippmann as well as the 
new problem of nuclear holocaust as the number of nuclear powers inevitably 
grows; cf. Kennedy, ibid. , pp. 514-515. In this passage Kennedy seems to wonder- 
as do we- whether US political leaders can handle the resulting “triple threat” of 
“imperial overstretch,” commitments beyond US resources, and nuclear prolifera-
tion all at the same time. Cf. also Charles Tilly’s provocative review of Motyl’s in-
complete “explanation” of The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires in Alex-
ander J. Motyl’s, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires 
(NY: Columbia Univ. Press), 2001. 
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new century, such evidence is slim.”
6 Much as we respect our former Dean, 
we must disagree. We find both statistical and anecdotal evidence point in 
the opposite direction. The US, like Russia though much less dramatically, 
is weakening in the sinews of economic, fiscal, and industrial power. It is 
becoming “hollowed out” in terms of its educational and infrastructure re-
sources as well. Thus, like the former Soviet Union, the US is becoming 
primarily a military superpower with its “side payments” leading to “impe-
rial overstretch.” But its leaders refuse to face the fact that it cannot “go it 
alone” and insist on pursuing a unilateral policy based on the “bright shin-
ing” instrument of its massive military, unmatched by any persuasive moral 
“coalition of the willing.” The result is a dramatic and dangerous gap be-
tween America’s unilateralist military policy on the one hand, and its moral 
and diplomatic policies on the other. We believe, in short, in the “Declin-
ist” school of thought on US foreign policy. We see the mighty US dollar 
declining against the euro, the US current account balance falling into 
greater and greater deficit, and America’s quondam financial superiority 
threatened by a mafia-like “Greed is Good” mentality. The quality of US 
schools, hospitals, and public services shrink even as cities and towns perch 
on the edge of bankruptcy while 44 million citizens are excluded from any 
kind of health insurance. “Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey, where 
wealth accumulates and men decay.”
7 
The Cold War’s End and the Demise of the USSR 
As Jessica Matthews trenchantly notes: “At its outset, the end of the Cold 
War meant the loss of the automatic deference accorded the US as the 
leader in the fight against a common mortal enemy. The absence of an ex-
ternal enemy…allowed domestic politics to acquire a much larger role in 
foreign policy on both sides of the Atlantic.”
8 However, the view from op-
posite sides of the Atlantic then became crucially different: the US looked 
 
6  Joseph S. Nye, Jr., op. cit, p. 112. 
7 Oliver  Goldsmith. 
8  Jessica L. Mathews in “Estranged Partners,” Foreign Policy (November/December, 
2001) as reprinted in American Foreign Policy, Annual Editions (03/04), pp. 43-
46).  
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out from its side and saw a world with many threats including “ethnic 
cleansing” and a growing vital threat from weapons of mass destruction 
which permeated the society after 9/11. The EU countries saw no need to 
counter these threats as a vital interest of their member states especially 
since the US was protecting them with its unmatched military machine. 
Moreover, the EU states were deeply engaged in an historic volte-face: the 
enlargement and deepening of the hugely successful economic power-
house of the European Union. And the economic “heart” of the EU, Ger-
many, was engaged in a vastly underestimated project of bringing the for-
mer East Germany (GDR) up to the very high standards of West Germany 
at a vast cost to its taxpayers with concomitant prejudices of  “Wessies” vs.  
“Ossies” [West Germans vs. East Germans-GC]. 
Contrasting US vs. EU Post WWII Development 
We posit an infrangible link between several historical manifestations of 
US Reversion to what we view as a “neo-Imperial Isolationism; ” the latest 
version is the “Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption.” Earlier versions included 
the old Manifest Destiny” doctrine, Polk & TR Corollaries to the Monroe 
Doctrine, and Senator Albert Beveridge’s Jan. 1900 speech to the US Sen-
ate. The background to the Bush Doctrine is clearly linked to doctrines of 
the US as a special country, a “city on a hill” and the mythology of 
“American Exceptionalism” - the view that America is a “special” country 
marked by God for a moral, economic, and especially military dominance 
in the world. At first linked to Latin America by the Monroe Doctrine of 
1823, it then developed further in “America’s backyard” to the “Polk Cor-
ollary” of 1845 by which the US acquired Arizona, California, and Texas 
after a brief invasion of Mexico. Then in 1904 came the Teddy Roosevelt 
(TR) Corollary by which the US assumed the right to occupy Central 
American countries guilty of putative “chronic wrongdoing” which might 
in America require intervention by ‘some civilized power", namely the 
US.
9 The Truman Doctrine added Greece and Turkey to the US list of for-
 
9  Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 2
nd Ed., (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJP: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), 195, pp. 168-9, 244, 417, and passim. 
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eign protected states and threatened Russia with nuclear weapons after 
WWII if Russia would not leave Iran even as Eisenhower during the Ko-
rean War threatened to use US nuclear weapons if necessary to end the Ko-
rean War.  
In sum, US Exceptionalism is a foreign policy doctrine of ethnocentrism, 
akin to other examples utilized in other countries but mediated by an 
American political culture which gave it a specific character. One thinks of 
Bismarck’s  Drang nach Osten (March to the East) or Moeller van den 
Brock’s apotheosis to Das Dritte Reich in Germany which preceded Hit-
ler’s Mein Kampf (My Battle); to France’s self-proclaimed mission under 
Napoleon to carry the doctrines of “La Nation humaine” to less fortunate 
countries. One may add the Comte de Gobineau’s ideal of French racial 
superiority expressed in Essai sur l’ inequalite des races. Finally, Great 
Russian ethnocentrism was clearly enunciated in Nikolai Danilevsky’s 
1869 essay, Rossiya I Evropa (Russia and Europe), or the views of Con-
stantine Pobedonostsev. In each case, the powerful force of ethnocentrism 
was expressed in nationalistic terms as mediated by the political culture of 
a unique nation-state. In the American case it was mediated by a particular 
set of historical experiences associated with the conquest and peopling of a 
new continent and the brutal clash with its indigenous peoples now termed 
“Native Americans.” Perhaps only in Australia or Canada was the US ex-
perience roughly duplicated, though the Russian conquest of Central Asia 
under Gens. Constantine Kaufman and Michael Skobelev was in some 
ways remarkably similar.
10 
The current manifestation of American ethnocentrism involves the effort to 
control WMD proliferation via unilateral US military power. It involved a 
clearly dismissive attitude toward multilateralism even toward US allies 
such as the UK and an effort to insist that the US-led “coalition of the will-
ing” is really very powerful regardless of the facts that the countries in-
volved-except for the U.K.-are minor powers. It further involved denigrat-
 
10  See Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 2
nd Ed. (London: Oxford Univ. 
Press), 1969, p. 432 where he notes that this Russian expansion “bears a certain re-
semblance both to colonial wars elsewhere and to the American westward move-
ment.”  
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ing “Old Europe” i.e., France and Germany while apotheosizing small 
powers such as the Baltic countries, Romania, and Poland. Moreover it in-
volved the disregard for politico-cultural differences with putative enemies.  
The US attitude of expansionism under Manifest Destiny began with some 
mordantly amusing examples of US cultural ignorance at the highest levels. 
For example, President McKinley lamented (the White Man’s Burden) in 
the best Rudyard Kiplingesque language: “there was nothing else for us 
[Americans-GC] to do but to take [the Philippine islands-GC] them all and 
to educate the Filipinos and to uplift and civilize and Christianize 
them…and I went to bed and … slept soundly.” Unfortunately for “them”; 
McKinley evidently did not know that the Filipinos had been Christians 
(albeit Catholics) for some 400 years!
11  
Even more primitive, by current standards of Manifest Destiny, was U.S. 
Senator Albert Beveridge’s address to the US Senate in January, 1900:  
“…the times call for candor. The Philippines are ours forever…. [but-GC] this 
question is deeper…. It is racial. God has not been preparing the English-
Speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing…. No. He has 
made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos 
reigns… he has made us adept in government that we may administer govern-
ment among savage and senile peoples…. And of all our race he has marked 
the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of 
the world. This is the divine mission of America…. We are trustees of the 
world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace.”
12  
We suggest that, mutates mutandis and despite unpersuasive politically cor-
rect statements to the contrary, this attitude subconsciously informs current 
US political culture as reflected in the Bush Doctrine. and the attitudes of 
those “conservative policy advocates” who in January 1998 sent a letter to 
President Bush. “Among the 18 signers were Donald H. Rumsfeld, Paul D. 
Wolfowitz, Richard L. Armitage, and Richard N. Perle, all former officials 
in Republican administrations.”
13 Clearly the Bush Doctrine suggests an 
 
11  Sheldon Appleton, United States Foreign Policy, An Introduction with Cases (Little, 
Brown and Co.), 1968, pp. 65-66. 
12  Ibid., p. 65.  
13  Steven R. Weisman,”Pre-emption Evolves from an Idea to Official Action,” New 
York Times, 03/23/03, p.B1A. 
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apparent “Search for Enemies,”
14 an expressed distaste for “Nation-
Building” as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. This distaste seems 
oddly mixed with an apparent unilateral military imperial “Overstretch.” 
(War against Iraq). We suggest this growing US imperial unilateralism is 
part of the recrudescence of U.S. Manifest Destiny clearly strengthened by 
the US position as the last superpower with legitimate worldwide commit-
ments. 
Clearly the US remained the only world superpower after the demise of the 
USSR. “Containment” via “mellowing” had largely succeeded as George 
Kennan had predicted. Moreover, the U.S. was left with an enormous mili-
tary machine unmatched in the world. The irresistible temptation was to 
use it for ends which seemed obviously beneficial to the coterie of conser-
vative intellectuals grouped around the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
and brought into the U.S. Government by George W. Bush, Jr. Often re-
ferred to “Neo-Conservatives” or “Neo-Cons”; they felt strongly that 
“chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs of ‘rogue states’ 
must be confronted with pre-emptive or even preventive action before an 
imminent threat materializes.”
15 Also called “Hawks”, they had been work-
ing on the problem of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction   
(WMD) for some years before and felt strongly that the US had failed in 
the Gulf War I in 1991 since Saddam remained in power. Weisman notes 
that some of them had worked under the older Bush and when his son as-
sumed office, many returned to power. Since the opposition Democratic 
Party seemed bereft of ideas on how to remove the worldwide threat of pro-
liferating WMD, the conservative hawks “ended up dominating the admini-
stration’s policy, defining an important shift in U.S./ foreign policy think-
ing.”
16 
Clearly, however, the policy Rx of the conservative Neo-Con Hawks - Sec-
retary of Defense Rumsfeld, Paul D. Wolfowitz, Richard L. Armitage, 
Richard N. Perle, Vice President Cheney, Douglas J. Feith, and I. Lewis 
(Scooter) Libby - is both broad and audacious. It is supported by the so-
 
14  John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story (NY: W.W. Norton), 1978. 
15  Weisman, op. cit., p. B1A. 
16  Op. cit., p. B1A [bolding added-GC]. 
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called “Religious Right” (even though most religious groups in the US and 
abroad strongly opposed it in general, and especially in the Iraq War). Op-
posing groups include the Pope and most non-Baptist fundamentalist lead-
ers of the US Protestant clergy, as well as most Muslim, Protestant, Catho-
lic, and Orthodox clergy at home and abroad.  
But the Neo-Con Hawks back in 1992 (under then-Secretary of Defense 
Cheney) developed “a document known as the Defense Planning Guidance 
which argued that the US should be prepared to use force to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons”
17 It was not too far an intellectual leap from 
there to the 30-page document issued by the White House on September 
17, 2002 entitled: The National Security Strategy of the United States.
18  
The FAS analysts, however, (Karl Kaysen, John D. Steinbrunner, and Mar-
tin B. Malin) argue that the document is really misleading. “Pre-emption” 
in the document’s case means “using force in anticipation of a danger to 
prevent hostile states from acquiring WMD or harboring terrorists” But the 
FAS analysts conclude: “In this particular case, “pre-emption” … is a mis-
characterization, since that term usually is taken to mean striking the first 
blow when war appears to be imminent and unavoidable. What the US is 
proposing is more properly characterized as “preventive war.” that is, a war 
of choice to prevent the emergence of a threat further in the future.”
19 (We 
must add that in our view, the Planning Document goes even further: It 
proposes a form of permanent as well as preventive war, since the enemy is 
self-expanding for US policy reasons and thus is conveniently never con-
quered.) 
Our FAS authors note further that under Truman and Eisenhower “such 
thinking was consistently rejected at the political level on both moral and 
 
17  Steven R. Weisman, “Pre-emption Evolves From an Idea to Official Action,” New 
York Times, 03/23/03, p. B10A-B. 
18  For a lucid discussion of this document and its etiology and ramifications, cf. FAS, 
vol. 55, no. 5, September/October 2002, “Behind the Prospect of War with Iraq: 
The New U.S. National Security Strategy.” For a copy of pp. 1-2, cf. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. 
19  FAS, op. cit., p. 5A. [bolding added-GC]. 
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strategic grounds as Russia and China developed nuclear WMD.
20 Today, 
they conclude, “preventive war” “is our declared policy to maintain the ca-
pability to wage preventive war against those who may threaten us with 
weapons of mass destruction.”  
In our view, the Bush Doctrine of preventive war as the linchpin of US ef-
forts to stop the proliferation of WMD is incompatible with the UN Charter 
as well as most international efforts such as the ABM Treaty, the Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, the Land Mines Treaty, the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty, and even the Kyoto anti-Global Warming Treaty. The Bush Doc-
trine simply means the US will go it alone or with a “coalition of the will-
ing”, i.e., those willing to accept US world hegemony in the name of halt-
ing proliferation of WMD. The audacity of the basic idea is stunning—as is 
its arrogance
21 and the near-certainty that it will fail. For even limited mili-
tary success will increase resistance in the recusant world both developed 
(Old Europe) and developing (Arab countries). Surely the international 
 
20   Ibid. For details of the Truman-Eisenhower repudiation of “preventive war” cf. 
 Marc Trachtenberg, “A Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nu-
clear Balance,” in Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 100-152 [bolding added-GC]. 
21  As a vivid example of the Bush Administration’s hawks’ arrogance, consider Rich-
ard Perle’s contemptuous view of the United Nations as a “Coalition of the Befud-
dled, Abject Failure of the United Nations,” in The Providence-Journal, 03/31/03, p. 
A10. Perle generously allows the UN a residual “good works” function, but em-
phatically excludes any policy-making role for the “chatterbox on the Hudson.” 
  “What will die in Iraq is the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of a new world 
order.” After two world wars, it appears that Pearle, like the Bourbon aristocrats af-
ter 1815 in France, “has learned nothing and forgotten nothing.” He is certain that 
“As we sift the debris of the war to liberate [sic!-GC] Iraq, it will be important to 
preserve, the better to understand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of 
safety through international law administered by international institutions.” So 
much for Wilson, FDR, and Arthur Vandenberg. So much from Hugo Grotius to 
Hans Kelsen, so away with Immanuel Kant’s dream of Eternal Peace (Ewiger 
Friede). Under Bush only US unilateral power will be permitted to safeguard the 
peace and only as Washington defines that term. Thus the Iraqis will be liberated 
according to Washington whether they like it or not. And it appears that a great 
many of them, while hating Saddam Hussein equally hate the idea of foreigners lib-
erating their country. Washington now speaks minatorily as it did in Vietnam of 
course “winning the hearts and minds” of the people. 
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dash for WMD exacerbated by US action against Iraq and inaction against 
North Korea, will continue despite any unilateral US action. Yet surely also 
only a tough international regime with teeth and legitimacy provided by the 
UN and enforced by the world’s major power could possibly stop the pro-
liferation of WMD.  
Yet as Prof. Nye has noted, the paradox of American power is that the 
world’s only superpower can’t go it alone.
22 Our defense budget is today 
larger than the combined defense expenditures of the next 25 largest mili-
taries”
23 but weapons alone cannot win wars. And if our use of them turns 
the world against us, we will eventually lose since we need moral, eco-
nomic, and especially political support from willing allies. This was 
brought home most vividly by Turkey’s refusal to let us use its terrain for a 
badly needed “northern front” against Iraq. Even when we in effect tried to 
“bribe them” via a huge “side payment” of $26B. They insisted on $32B in 
a US aid package! 
24 With allies like that, the US hardly needs enemies, and 
one wonders how many US soldiers were wounded or killed because of this 
Turkish action and how long the reconstruction was prolonged because the 
U.S. Fourth Infantry Division had to be diverted from the Turkish Coast to 
Northern Iraq. 
We conclude that the neo-Cons’ idea of using the huge superiority of the 
U.S. military was a “quantum jump” but still clear akin to the liberal vision 
of the “best and the brightest” under President Kennedy. His successors 
Lyndon Baynes Johnson, and his brilliant Secretary of Defense, Robert S. 
McNamara, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger all wanted to defeat Ho 
and the North Vietnamese. The Neo-Con idea also had echoes of the effort 
to defeat Fidel Castro in Cuba via an attack of expatriates at the Bay of 
Pigs. We suggest that all these military operations had as a tacit or ex-
pressed false predicate that the U.S. military could quickly defeat such 
 
22  Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power, Why the World’s Only Super-
power Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 2002). 
23  FAS, op. cit., p. 3. 
24  Dexter Filkins with Eric Schmitt, “Bargaining: Turkey Demands $32 Billion U.S. 
Aid Package,” New York Times, 02/19/03, p. A17. Also see, “Turkey requests 
more U.S. aid in return for help against Iraq,” Providence Journal-Bulletin, 
02/19/03, p. A6. 
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backward nations and easily rebuild them after their defeat. In each case a 
plausible scenario was put forward which was congruent with elite attitudes 
in the U.S. and within “the beltway.” What was not considered, we sug-
gest, was how the targets of the U.S. military or their allies (in Cuba, Af-
ghanistan, or Iraq) would actually respond. But the success of US opera-
tions depended upon responses by the target peoples congruent with US 
elite expectations: i.e., we would “win the hearts and minds” of the Viet-
namese peasants, the Cuban people, or the Iraqis who would quickly appre-
ciate the basic altruism of US actions and intentions. They would thus re-
volt against their cruel masters, i.e., Ho, Fidel, and Saddam. They didn’t, of 
course, for various reasons having, in our view, to do with their quite dif-
ferent political cultures. Even in the case of Iraq, the repressed Shia pro-
tested vigorously against US “occupation”.  This despite the irony, so evi-
dent on US television, that they could never have protested at all under 
Saddam’s brutal Sunni secular dictatorship! That irony seemed lost on the 
protesting Shia, however, who seemed to dislike a foreign (US) “occupa-
tion” almost as much as they detested Saddam’s domestic dictatorship. 
At present it appears that some of the realities of US foreign policy have 
begun to “sink in.” the Neo-Con “unilateralists vs. the “internationalists” in 
the Bush Junior Ad-ministration seem to have split. Warren P. Strobel sug-
gests: 
“The Unilateralists jokingly refer to themselves as a cabal and their goals in-
clude stamping out international terrorism; eliminating nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons in unfriendly hands; negotiating a peace treaty between Is-
rael and all its Arab neighbors on terms favorable to Israel; and eliminating inte-
national constraints on America’s freedom of action. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell and his allies in the uniformed military and the CIA share at least the first 
three goals, but seek to accomplish them by working within the existing interna-
tional system. The internationalists favor repairing relations with France, Ger-
many, and Russia, all damaged in the disagreement over the Iraq war; revitaliz-
ing the United Nations, and pursuing a peace deal between Israel and the Pales-
tinians, even if that means pressuring Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to 
make concessions.”
25 
 
25 Warren P. Strobel, “Foreign policy divides Bush team,” Providence Journal, 
04/19/03, p. A9abc.  
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The US civilian elite thus projected upon these target peoples its own po-
litical cultural beliefs usually without any detailed knowledge of how the 
peoples themselves felt. Nor could the US decision-making elites under-
stand these political cultural beliefs since they were totally alien to their 
own upbringing both as Americans in general, and as elite Americans in 
particular. US decisional elites came largely from either Eastern “liberal” 
establishment “hawks” on Vietnam and Cuba; from or Western “Neo-Con” 
establishment “hawks” as supported by fundamentalist Christians on Cuba 
and Iraq. The considered opinions of many State Department desk officers 
and CIA specialists with actual areal experience in these target countries 
was usually overlooked and apparently never made it to the decision-
making levels of the US government. In some cases, top-level pressure was 
placed upon “working level” officials to “cook the books” or twist facts 
and policy Rx to those desired by the White House.
26  
The failure of cabinet-level and National Security Council and White 
House decision-makers to understand foreign political cultures is, in our 
view, related to the fact that they are drawn from the ranks of successful oil 
industry executives, international and national banking experts, and occa-
sional “hawk” academics with a limited understanding of US and espe-
cially foreign political cultures. Clearly they often have very little under-
standing of the foreign political cultures which they target. For example in 
the two different US Government agencies in which the author served, it 
was striking how little the operating heads knew about the countries in 
which they were operating: language, religion, culture, history, even geog-
raphy were impressive by their absence.  
Tragically we conclude that typically “Those who know are not decision-
makers, while decision makers are those who don’t.” The US system for 
foreign policy execution thus strongly favors poorly informed foreign pol-
icy leaders as we have seen in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Columbia, Iraq, 
Rwanda, and Vietnam. This long-term problem is severely exacerbated by 
 
26  Cf. James Risen, “C.I.A. Aides Feel Pressure in Preparing Iraqi Reports”, New York 
Times, 03/23/03, p. B10F. 
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adding ideological fanaticism to the process. It is unfortunate, but true, as 
Gary Sick observed recently that: “Iran has its Ayatollahs - and we have 
ours”
27 
“War is too important to be left to the Generals” 
                                     -- Georges Clemenceau 
Moreover, despite the admonition of Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister 
of France during WWI cited above, we suggest that the US develops its 
foreign and security policies largely based upon the use of the military op-
tion, for several reasons. First, the military option often seems “quick and 
easy,” while the process of “nation-building” is slow, expensive, and frus-
trating. Bush instinctively rejected “Nation-Building” as a policy objective 
during his last presidential campaign. Second, the American political cul-
ture stresses the use of “force first”. This is the way the US expanded 
across a continent with the use of technological superiority and superior 
organization against the indigenous population.
28 It also worked very well 
against Mexico under Polk and against Columbia under Theodore Roose-
velt in establishing the Panama Canal.
29 Why interfere with a successful 
strategy? The “Bush Doctrine as currently interpreted by the Secretary of 
Defense has developed a new and audacious war strategy: overwhelmingly 
superior weapons technology with a minimum of conventional ground 
forces.  
 
27  Gary Sick on Lou Dobbs TV Program, “Money Line,” 05/12/03. We agree that “on 
the issues of defense and security, the blow-back [between the US & France and 
Germany-GC] is likely to be fiercest. U.S. officials have talked of limiting France’s 
influence in NATO.” On this point, cf. Daniel Rubin, “U.S. begins repair of ties 
with Europe,” Providence Journal, 05/03/03, p. A6. 
28 Cf. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of Frontier in American History 
(1893). “Turner pointed out that the frontier has been the one great determinant of 
American civilization, a point of departure from previous writers who stressed con-
tinuity of American institutions with Europe.” Richard B. Morris (Ed.), Encyclope-
dia of American History (NY: Harper & Bros.), 1953, p. 578A.  
29  Cf. the detailed account by David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas, The 
Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1977.  
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This has led to a conflict in military strategy between Rumsfeld and quon-
dam Gen. Colin Powell whose “Powell Doctrine” dictated overwhelming 
force both technological and conventional. The Rumsfeld Doctrine not 
only won the war in Iraq, but will probably change the face of war world-
wide in the future.
30 But it may also lose the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq 
for it led to too few “boots on the ground” to prevent looting or destruction 
of hospitals and priceless antiquities as well as vital oil production facilities 
in Iraq. It may also lead to the failure of US efforts at “Nation-Building” in 
both countries.
31 
Under either Doctrine, however, the U.S. Government emphasizes compul-
sion, not persuasion. Its leaders do not listen well to “non-Group Think” 
speakers, especially those with deplorable foreign accents who present un-
comfortable facts. We agree “In America, as elsewhere, foreign policy is 
made by elites rather than by the populace and elite values are likely to dif-
fer from those of the masses.” But Appleton is also correct in asserting that 
in American egalitarian ideology, and often in practice, “American political 
institutions and traditions ordinarily ensure that the nation’s political lead-
ers will share the fundamental value orientations of their followers, at least 
in part.” In addition the electoral power of the populace is sufficient to set 
 
30  Matthew Brzezinski, “Autopilot: Can the Next War Be Fought with No Soldiers at 
All?”, New York Times Magazine (04/20/03, section 6), pp. 38-42. 
31  The New York Times summarized the apparent failures of the Bush Doctrine well in 
our view: “The yearning to right wrongs has a noble tradition in American foreign 
policy, and few could oppose those portions of the Bush doctrine that would extend 
the benefits of freedom, democracy, prosperity and the rule of law to the far corners 
of the globe. Unfortunately, these goals were overshadowed by an arrogant, go-it-
alone stance and an aggressive claim to the right to use pre-emptive action against 
threatening states.” The Times concludes: “For many people and nations, the way 
the Bush administration went after Saddam Hussein confirmed fears, raised by the 
[Bush-GC] doctrine. That is one reason why the move to war drew so much opposi-
tion around the world, and why this page urged the administration to pursue its 
goals in Iraq within an international framework. A doctrine that purports to spread 
happiness, but ends up spreading resentment, is not working, no matter how many 
statues come tumbling down. That is why it is especially important now to show 
that the US also has the confidence and wisdom to sheath its sword until it is really 
needed.” Editorial, 04/13/05, p. 12. 
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important basic limitations on the freedom of those who make US foreign 
policy.”
32 
We suggest then, that the basic modal view of Americans is still Isolation-
ism and that Arthur Vandenburg’s volte-face affected primarily the political 
and military elite at the end of the Cold War. Hidden behind the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan lay the mass and elite view of America, the 
“City on a Hill,” the country of moral purity founded by those who sought 
religious freedom and a more egalitarian, richer, and fuller life. Much as 
intellectuals may scoff-especially at President Bush’s efforts to transfer 
vast sums to the very wealthy at the expense of the middle class- this 
Lockean myth of putative equality still maintains its power to inspire most 
Americans. This is especially true when US armed forces are engaged 
against enemies real or created, since such conflicts are covered by “Old 
Glory,”—the US flag and potent nationalist symbol of American unity.  
We contend that the link between the current “Unilateralism” of the “neo-
Cons” is infrangibly connected to the Isolationism regnant during the post-
WWI period up to Pearl Harbor. “Isolationism” and “Unilateralism” are 
thus joined at the policy hip, since the neo-Cons wish to operate in “isola-
tion” from the rest of the world and in opposition to the world’s expressed 
desire for “Internationalist” solutions operating through the United Nations 
and in support of the Charter and international law. The US has violated 
both in the Iraq case and now finds itself without significant support in re-
building what it has destroyed. James Steinberg, deputy national security 
adviser to ex-President Clinton, notes the audacity of the neo-Con plans: 
“One option is for Mr. Bush to make clear that “Saddam was a pretty 
unique [sic-GC] case” in which the US felt it had to act without explicit 
U.N. approval, but “we’re not trying to break the (international system…).” 
“The other … is to see the war in Iraq as a ‘world-transforming event’ that 
leads to a radical overhaul of global institutions such as the UN and possi-
bly to American military forays elsewhere.”
33 Again, one may admire the 
audacity of the Neo-Con plan but regret its results and the enormous costs 
 
32 Sheldon  Appleton,  United States Foreign Policy: An Introduction with Cases. (Bos-
ton: Little, Brown and Co.) 1968, pp. 37-38. 
33 Strobel,  op. cit., p. A9c [bolding added-GC]. 
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it will place on American alliances, foreign policy, and skyrocketing na-
tional debt if carried out. 
Moreover, in the recent past American mythology has been based upon real 
fact. America is a rich country, and the frontier and the six-shooter helped 
make each man equal- unlike Europe with its true conservatives such as 
Bismarck in Prussia,  Gobineau
34 in France, or Pobedonostsev or 
Danilevsky in Russia.  In the US, however, “Conservatives” (Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists) not only supported the Revolution - they led it. The 
US Constitution was required for their own prosperity; indeed it was a set 
of rules within which each individual and each group could and does strug-
gle for power with some justified hope of attaining their share. 
In Europe, however, long after the French and Russian revolutions and the 
Weimar Republic the “old Cons” won. The trick was to “marry” conserva-
tive ideology with nationalism, religious intolerance, and racism, which the 
masses could then be persuaded to accept. Thus Bismarck’s Kulturkampf 
 
34 See  his  Essai sur l’ineqalite des races humaines which first appeared in 1853. He 
combined racism with nationalism just as did Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev 
known as the “evil genius” of the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II. Interest-
ingly enough, Richard Perle of the Bush Administration is often referred to by his 
opponents as the “dark Angel” and deemed the intellectual and political leader of 
the Neo-Con leaders of the Bush Doctrine. On Gobineau, see Gaetano Mosca, The 
Ruling Class [Elementi de Scienza Politica] (NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.), 
1939, pp. 17-8. On Pobedonostsev, see Ernest J. Simmons (Ed.), Continuity and 
Change in Russian and Soviet Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press), pp. 
113-128, “Pobedonostsev on the Instruments of Russian Government,” by Robert F. 
Byrnes. On Danilevsky’s “quasi-scientific racist variety” of Pan-Slavism, cf. Nicho-
las V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 2
nd Ed., (London: Oxford Univ. Press), 
1969, p. 500; also Thomas Riha (ed.), Readings in Russian Civiilization, vol. II, 
1700-1917 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press), Ch. 31, pp. 387-393, “The Slav Role 
in World Civilization.” In words strikingly reminiscent of US Senator Albert 
Beveridge (with appropriate changes for Russian political culture), Danilevsky 
notes: “…. there hardly ever has existed or exists a people so capable of enduring 
such a large share of freedom as the Russians and so little inclined to abuse it, due 
to their ability and habit to obey, their respect and trust in the authorities, their lack 
of love for power, and their loathing of interference in matters where they do not 
consider themselves competent.” In sum, Danilevsky makes a virtue of what 
Americans might call Russian habits of slavish obedience to authority and sees pu-
tative dislike of power as the touchstone of Russians’ superiority over other peoples. 
[p. 389b]. 
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(cultural war against the Catholic Church) and his Maigesetze (May Laws) 
against the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) were populist measures. 
Similar attitudes by Gobineau and Pobedonostsev married religious, class, 
and nationalist pressures to crush liberal views of constitutional democracy 
in post-revolutionary France and Czarist pre-revolutionary Russia. 
In the US, however, most people could expect material prosperity, and 
even immigrants and the poor could hope for a very real increase in their 
standard of living. Therefore all classes supported the US Constitution. As 
one German analyst put it, what destroyed “the class struggle in America 
was the Ford car and apple pie.” Our professor Louis Hartz argued there-
fore that the US never had a truly conservative, openly anti-democratic 
conservative movement such as that supported by Bismarck, Gobineau, or 
Danilevsky, or Pobedonostsev since American “conservatives” at least 
nominally supported the Bill of Rights. It is an irony of American life that 
the US Constitution did not seem to inhibit the reification of their views to 
any substantial degree. The powerful myths of US political culture remain 
intact long after the reality of economic and financial life has made a 
mockery of Lockean and Smithian theories of equality and the “free mar-
ket.” For most Americans, the US is still a “City on a Hill” with “liberty 
and justice for all” and under God (since 1954). 
Thus the enduring elements of the American political culture have re-
mained largely preserved by the central myth of US life: “all men are cre-
ated equal.” Other attributes of American political culture include an aver-
sion to theory, per se, and a preference for the tangible over the intangible. 
This preference is mixed in with a “short time perspective” and a distaste 
for long-term orientation. In foreign policy this abbreviated time perspec-
tive and desire for “quick concrete results” have been embodied by the 
Neo-Cons in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Kosovo. It is also seen in Presi-
dent Bush clearly expressed distaste for “nation building.” Again, as 
Appleton notes: “… much to the nation’s detriment, those who advocate 
the kind of foreign policies most likely to prove effective in the long run 
are often at a critical disadvantage in the political marketplace.”
35 We sug-
est that: "Nation-Building” in general and specifically in Iraq will be  g
 
35 Appleton,  op. cit., pp. 42-43, passim. 
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that: "Nation-Building” in general and specifically in Iraq will be short-
changed by Washington Neo-Cons, since they influenced as elite policy-
makers by mass attitudes demanding quick results. We also suggest that the 
“preference for military solutions” is also part of US political culture as 
adopted by the elite yet consistent with mass attitudes. Other attributes of 
the US political culture with a serious impact on the formulation of Ameri-
can foreign policy are the diversity of the US population when juxtaposed 
with the peculiar effectiveness of interest groups. Thus we notice the lack 
of concern for looting in Iraq as part of what Appleton refers to as the 
“normal indifference of the many to foreign affairs has been to increase the 
influence of the few.”
36 The evident disinterest of the Pentagon for cultural 
treasures looted from the Iraqi National Museum vs. the careful positioning 
of US troops to guard the Iraqi Oil Ministry suggest elite concerns vs. pub-
lic indifference. Clearly the US ideological commitment to “democracy” or 
“free markets” is not violated by failure to protect hospitals or ancient an-
tiquities. Neither is the awarding of major contracts to US companies with 
close ties to the Bush Administration (Bechtel and Haliburton). Elite media 
such as the New York Times may complain bitterly but the Murdoch-
controlled press and Fox News do not, and the mass of Americans does not 
complain either. Rather both are supported and watched by the great mid-
dle class of Americans. 
In conclusion, US diversity, tight organization of certain elites such as 
business and military, and a vague amorphous commitment to terms such 
as “democracy” or “free market” do not appear contradictory to the gener-
ally accepted modal American political culture. Only when leaders unwit-
tingly and obviously contradict that culture does the US electorate respond 
negatively. Two examples are when President Eisenhower publicly admit-
ted the U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was spying on the USSR or when 
Ronald Reagan tried to trim “social security” did each of these very popu-
lar leaders run into “a firestorm” of criticism. The first violated the obvi-
ously absurd principle that the US never engages in “immoral behavior” 
such as spying, and the second that a beloved leader would injure the wel-
 
36  Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
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fare of “senior citizens” by reducing their “right” to social security in old 
age.  
A second important factor is that Washington is a political city with a 
unique “Beltway” political subculture. Its main interest is power—who has 
it and how to get it. The joke is that “if you want a friend in Washington, 
get a dog.” Moreover, money talks and the Department of Defense has 
$350B, while the CIA and all other members of the intelligence community 
get about $18B. The State Department’s financing is much less than either 
and, worse yet, it represents not US but “foreign” interests and “foreign” 
governments.  
Why “State Can’t Lead”
37 
One official points out the reasons why the U.S. Department of State “can’t 
lead.” We have found in our own experience in Government that, unfortu-
nately, he seems to be correct and that State’s and the C.I.A.’s expertise 
often does not make its way up the chain of command to the decision-
making levels with often tragic results: 
•  First, the State Department is not equipped to coordinate actions of 
other Agencies and departments efficiently.  
•  Second, if … State attempted this Role [as it occasionally does as 
noted above-GC] bureaucratic in fighting and parochialism would 
result.  
•  Third, the [NSC] is a better organization to coordinate foreign policy 
- it is the only governmental unit that can function as a neutral policy 
broker from the president’s perspective.  
•  Finally, fourth, the White House often does not trust the State De-
partment to be the primary organ of advice and information.  
 
37  Duncan L. Clarke, “Why State Can’t Lead,” from Foreign Policy (Spring 1987), pp. 
128-142 as reprinted in Jerel A. Rosati, Readings in the Politics of United States 
Foreign Policy (NY: Harcourt Brace), 1998, Ch. 11, pp. 104-5 [bolding added-GC]. 
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Additionally, Clarke highlights the powerful role played by the Foreign 
Service subculture in all this.” Thus “State Can’t Lead” in U.S. foreign pol-
icy and is often “suspect” at the White House and NSC and DoD. Struggles 
between the Secretary of State vs. hawkish assistants to the President for 
National Security Affairs or the Secretary of State vs. Secretary of Defense 
are common and famous for their savagery, e.g., Cyrus Vance vs. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski or Colin Powell vs. Donald Rumsfeld. In both cases State lost. 
The result is that although theoretically, the Secretary of State is supposed 
to be “the President’s chief foreign policy adviser” usually he isn’t. Some 
such as Cordell Hull were simply bypassed by the President, others such as 
Henry Kissinger kept their NSC hats even though they are appointed Secre-
tary of State. Kissinger co-opted a few a few top Foreign Service Officers 
while ignoring the rest as he and President Nixon themselves conducted US 
foreign policy. Under Kissinger, even the Defense Secretary was subordi-
nate in many cases as the former conducted “2
nd track” or covert diplomacy 
while others led the 1
st track of public diplomacy to end the Vietnam War 
(unsuccessfully we may note). One must also note in fairness that except in 
Europe and Vietnam, the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy was often strik-
ingly effective as in the opening to China and US-Russian détente. But we 
suggest that was largely because they listened and did not consider them-
selves experts in areas where they did not know the cultures. In Vietnam, 
both were “locked into” policies originated by presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson, while Kissinger failed in his “Year of Europe” and especially in 
Cyprus because he thought he knew the areas well. As Mark Twain once 
observed: “It ain’t what you knows that gets you in trouble, it’s what you 
knows that ain’t so!” And Kissinger’s Metternichian Realpolitik ran into a 
rather different and evolving philosophy developed by creative giants such 
as Robert Schuman, Jean Monet, Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle - 
a union of Europe based on French-German rapprochement. In the mean-
time, US policy under Kissinger was imposed upon US officials with per-
sonal experience and detailed knowledge of the political cultures of the tar-
get countries. In one case, this led to the famous “Kissinger grunt” regard-
ing US policy toward Angola, a rare example of humor in a decidedly un-
humorous situation: 
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“Potts turned to Mulcahy and spoke pleasantly.  
“Well, Ed, what did Kissinger say?”…  
Finally Mulacahey spoke, “He didn’t exactly say anything.” …  
“Did he read the paper?”….  
Mulcahy nodded ruefully.  
“He read it. Then he grunted and walked out of his office.”  
“Grunted?”  
“Yeah, like, unnph!”….  
“Well, was it a positive grunt or a negative grunt?”… 
“It was just a grunt. Like unnaph. I mean it didn’t go up or down.” 
Stockwell concludes that his little underling group agreed to do nothing 
since “Inaction was safe and easier to correct.” Thus was U.S. policy de-
cided on the Angola war in the spring of 1975 under Henry Kissinger’s iron 
control, a control that lasted some eight years and increased as President 
Nixon became increasingly preoccupied by Watergate.
38 
EU & Member State Policy-Making 
In EU member states, however, the foreign minister often leads his country 
as seems true under Joshka Fischer of Germany or his counterparts in Brit-
ain and France. Thus the accumulated “lore” of the foreign minister of the 
EU member state is applied to solving an existing problem such as Kosovo, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Iraq. This does not always produce a viable solu-
tion, but we would suggest that it is a more effective arrangement than the 
US system. We have already cited the “Tiger of France” during WWI, 
Georges, Clemenceau,’s bon mot, “War is too important a matter to be left 
to the generals.” Pearl Harbor is perhaps an outstanding example of this 
policy. When his carrier pilots returned jubilantly, Admiral Yamamoto 
sadly observed, “I fear we have but awakened a sleeping dragon!” The 
British insist that the military should always “be on tap, but never on top.” 
In the US case, the culture of the military is quite different from that of the 
British Army, which has always allowed officers more freedom, e.g., T. E. 
Lawrence, “Chinese Gordon” et al. In the US the dangers of “group think” 
seem quite intimidating and the best generals themselves speak of “inces-
 
38 John  Stockwell,  In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story (NY: W. W. Norton), 1978, p. 
22.  
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tuous amplification”
39 or what we could call “Group Think” as applied to 
civilian DoD decision-making. This is why it is a pity that in the US sys-
tem, those State and C.I.A. desk officers with hands-on experience with 
foreign political cultures are often excluded from real decision-making. 
Frequently, as noted earlier they are either sidelined or they are forced to 
“cook the books.” One C.I.A. officer who allegedly experienced this was 
John Adams III whose studies of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese 
(NVA) infrastructure led him to question official DoD estimates of Viet 
Cong force levels. 
The EU member states are all democracies- indeed the acquis communi-
taire and Copenhagen Agreement and other accession documents require a 
strict adherence to a liberal “civil society.” The gap between Europe and 
America is wide.
40 The main reason Turkey has not yet been accepted is 
that the EU has doubted its adherence to a democratic, constitutional civil 
society. Thus the irony is that Turkey- in rejecting U.S. demands for troop 
transit rights over its territory has, for perhaps the first time, rejected the 
views of its generals and listened to the demands of its people.” So much 
for the value of democracies as allies in the U.S. Bush policy. 
Moreover, both as member states and as a slowly solidifying pre-
confederacy, the EU peoples clearly prefer a foreign policy of support for 
internationalism. They differ from the U.S. in two respects:  
1. They have experienced the horrors of war on their own land and 
therefore want a world order under the UN and not under the US. 
2.  They did not undergo the terrorist horrors of 9/11 on their territory, 
and they doubt the efficacy of the US unilateral anti-terrorist policy. 
 
39  Craig A. Smith, “Joking Aside, A Serious Antipathy To Things American Rises in 
Europe,” New York Times, 02/14/03, p. A11. “The joke, playing off the European 
stereotype of Americans as simple-minded … highlights the surprisingly vast cul-
tural gap that divides and periodically confounds people on either side of the Atlan-
tic…. The Iraq crisis has sharpened those differences and exacerbated the current 
sense of trans-Atlantic estrangement.”  
40  Craig A. Smith, ibid. 
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Nor do they have the resources as member states, to defend against 
terrorism worldwide with their limited national means.
41  
Additionally, unlike the US which settled these problems in 1789 and 
1861-1865, the EU member states are preoccupied with rule-based conti-
nental developments via an agenda for enlargement and deepening the cur-
rently somewhat shallow organization of the EU. Created by intellectuals 
with a dream of uniting democratic Europe and thus preventing the recru-
descence of the Napoleonic Wars, WWI, and WWII; the EU leadership has 
relatively less interest in non-regional affairs. Kosovo and Bosnia-
Herzegovina are one thing, Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq quite another.  An 
interesting exception is the Congo, where the nascent RRF will deploy  
troops in support of French forces already there. 
In an illustrative statement issued on February 18, 2003, the 15 heads of 
state of the EU issued a statement which was tough on Saddam Hussein but 
made clear the EU’s basic preference for a peaceful solution of the Iraq 
problem. Moreover, it “perfectly captured the divide between the US and a 
vast majority of European public opinion. ‘We are committed to the United 
Nations remaining at the center of the international order,’ the declaration 
said. ‘We recognize that the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi 
disarmament lies with the [UN-GC] Security Council.’ 
The EU heads of state declaration went even further into dangerous waters. 
“In what may be viewed as a form of world government, the supervision of 
countries by an international civil service bureaucracy whose headquarters 
is the UN.” Bernstein notes the divide between Europe and the US: “This is 
a notion that has long been viewed with suspicion by the US.” He con-
cludes: “the cultural differences between Europeans and Americans boils 
down in practice to this: European governments believe in the UN as the 
‘center of world order’ and the American government, especially the cur-
rent American government, tends to be hostile to that idea.”
42 
 
41  Cf. Richard Bernstein, “The Europeans: Nations Prefer World Order Centered on 
U.N., Not U.S,” New York Times, 02/19/03. 
42  Ibid. 
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Yet how odd! For the fact is that the UN is largely an American invention, 
its headquarters are located in the US, and efforts to develop the concept of 
international law and international judicial institutions had strong support 
in the U.S. Everyone at the time recognized the obvious: FDR was “the 
spiritual father of the United Nations.”
43 Washington did not join the 
League of Nations, but it did join its associated legal organ, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. The Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928 was a joint 
effort by the U.S. and France to “outlaw war.”  
Most of the problems in EU foreign policy decision-making in our view 
derive from its organizational structure. Indeed we must agree that 
“…much of the policy of the EU can best be understood as bureaucratic 
politics”
44 Like most “top-down” political structures it suffers from bu-
reaucracy and its attendant weaknesses. It also has an associated dilemma 
in the EU Commission: its conscience forces it to enlargement and at-
tempted integration of states which are not fully developed civil societies, 
but its structure and history give it a “remote and intrusive” appearance to 
its national member states and peoples. This is often referred to as “the de-
mocratic deficit” which is natural for a supranational organization origi-
nated by brilliant bureaucrats which has not had time to anchor itself in the 
affections of the people of the member states.
45 
Yet the European Union has become perhaps the most hopeful product of 
the horrors of WWI and WWII. It is clearly the world’s largest trading bloc 
and its introduction of the European Monetary Union has transformed the 
economies both of the member states and the entire world. Before the cur-
rent enlargement to 25 members, the 15 had a larger population than the 
US (375.3million vs. 271.5 million and an aggregate GDC slighter smaller 
than the EU: ($8,345.9 billion vs. $8,230.9 billion.)
46 The EU has thus be-
come an international organization and a sort of pre-confederal suprana-
 
43  Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares, The Problems and Progress of Interna-
tional Organization (NY: Random House) 4
th Ed., p. 61. 
44  M. Donald Hancock, David P. Conradt et al., Politics in Europe, 3
rd Ed. NY/Seven 
Bridges Press, LLC), 2003, p. 502. 
45  Passim, pp. 480, 489. 
46  Hancock, et al, Table 31.1 & 31.2, pp. 468-9. 
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tional body with many characteristics of a national government. Its con-
stituent organs mirror in some ways the typical structure of European cabi-
net democracies rather than the presidential structure familiar to Ameri-
cans. Both legislative and executives functions are thus “mixed” rather than 
separated as in the US system. The Council of the EU and the European 
Council really represent the member states and are made up of officials 
representing the 15 member states. The EU “executive power” resides pri-
marily in the European Commission which is a supranational body that ex-
ercises important executive and supervisory powers on behalf of the EU as 
a whole and which makes its decisions behind closed doors. The analogy 
here would be the Cabinet in the UK which, under the leadership of the 
Prime Minister, usually also does not reach decisions openly until it pre-
sents them to the House of Commons where they are debated vigorously. 
The only EU body with “transparency” is the elective European Parliament 
whose deliberations are open as in the case of European member state de-
mocracies including the U.K. 
Clearly “From the outset, the European integration movement has been 
‘elite-driven’, with all major initiatives to create, deepen, and expand the 
Community emanating from the national and regional political levels of 
politics.” Such decision-making, while understandable, leads to a feeling of 
“remoteness” and a ‘democratic deficit’ in institutional behavior and ac-
countability.”
47 
The EU Council 
From our perspective looking for a cohesive foreign policy from the EU, 
the fact that the only “binding” body of the EU is the Council whose “di-
rectives” are binding as to results, although implementation is left to the 
governments of the member states. However, the Council also issues “regu-
lations” which are directly binding and require no implementing national 
legislation as in the case of the directives. Thus unlike UN Secretariat “de-
cisions” or international treaties, the EU regulations do not require member 
 
47  Ibid., p. 480. 
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governments’ “enabling legislation” to carry out their intent. For this rea-
son the EU Council is “supranational ” rather than solely “intergovernmen-
tal” in law and in practice. 
A major problem with respect to delicate foreign policy and security issues 
for the EU is the complex nature of “decision-making modes” employed. 
Major “substantive” issues require unanimity of the Council, simple major-
ity of Council votes for “procedural” issues, and the famous (or infamous) 
qualified majority voting or QMV. 
Under the Single European Act of 1986 the QMV procedure has been 
changed somewhat which in turn has increased the “supranational” charac-
ter of the Council and the EU itself so that now a simple majority is now 
“sufficient to enact most policies.”
48 The Council is also widely seen as the 
“brake” in the EU structure, if not the “locus” of most “parochialism” in 
the EU. With the addition of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, the 
“blocking minority” of the Council of 23 was increased to 26, while 23 
could postpone a Council decision. The Council QVM went from 53 out of 
76 but after the compromise agreement of March 1994, the QVM became 
62 of 87. The danger to any individual member state increased and none 
wished to become a “pariah” within the Community. This contributed to 
the “revolt” against Margaret Thatcher’s opposition to an increased UK 
role within the EU, particularly increased UK support for the EMU. It also 
contributed to her decision to resign as Tory Party leader in late November 
of 1990. 
The European Commission 
The European Commission is the more permanent executive of the Euro-
pean Union and thus the source of much of the movement toward greater 
integration both enlargement by the addition of primarily Eastern European 
members plus Malta and Cyprus as well as “deepening” of the EU’s power, 
i.e., further progress toward a pre-confederal organization. Thus commis-
sioners take an oath of loyalty to the EU and promise to accept no national 
instructions on policy. Formerly a “haven” for national politicians who 
 
48 Hancock,  et al., p. 484. 
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were regarded as “uncomfortable” at home, the Commission was some-
thing of a pleasant “exile”. More recently, however, it has become a home 
for younger technocrats such as Roy Jenkins of the UK and Jacques Delors 
of France who have supplied much of the drive for enlargement and deep-
ening of the EU. Other commissioners have been regarded as too close to 
their home countries despite their oath to be independent.  
The EU Council appoints one commission member as President with close 
consultation with the member countries. The tradition has arisen that the 
Commission President will alternate between the larger and the smaller 
member countries. The Commission is the major “permanent executive” of 
the EU and thus has been the opposite of the Council - the major power 
behind more EU integration. As such the term “Commission” applies not 
only to the 20 commissioners, but also to the permanent bureaucracy of the 
Commission, i.e., the “Eurocrats” in Brussels. This includes some 2,500 
civil servants plus 10,000 additional staff. Most Eurocrats are EU employ-
ees though some are on leave from their member state governments. The 
EU bureaucracy is divided into 36 “directorates-general (DGs), which cor-
respond to specific functional or policy tasks. Though smaller than many 
member state bureaucracies, they are highly skilled. Each “DG” is headed 
by a director-general under the supervision of a commissioner and a cabinet 
of no more than six personal advisers.  
Clearly the work of the Commission is analogous to that of a member state 
public bureaucracy except that the EU “Eurocrats” are less concerned with 
the direct implementation of laws than their member state opposite num-
bers. In most instances the Eurocrats depend on their national counterparts 
to implement Community law. The main job of the Commission is to gen-
erate rules, European rules. The Commission thus promulgates rules and 
regulations based on the underlying constituent EU treaties: the Treaty of 
Rome, the Single Europe Act, the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the Maastricht Treaty and others. Though most Commission 
rules must be approved by supervisory groups under the Council, the initia-
tive for rulemaking lies in the hands of the Commission and its Eurocrats 
which are usually given considerable influence over the final shape of EU 
policy just as is true in the case of member state and U.S. bureaucrats. This 
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is the more true since the Commission sets the EU Council’s agenda and 
this gives the Commission the opportunity to try to increase the speed of 
integration—both economic and political.  
This increasing role of the Commission has led to a dilemma discussed ear-
lier—it has become the “conscience” of the EU, pushing for enlargement 
on moral grounds, but it also is seen by many outside experts and popula-
tions as embodying a “democratic deficit” which is perhaps endemic to its 
bureaucratic remoteness and elite-driven staffing. Since the EU has an 
“open” Parliament and an embryonic if sophisticated executive, its major 
structural political problem is how to link the two. At present, the Commis-
sion is not clearly accountable to the EU Parliament analogous to the way 
public executive bureaucracies in member states are “responsible” to their 
parliaments or as the US executive departments are responsible to the US 
Congress for carrying out the laws and for justifying funding. Moreover, 
despite direct elections to the EU Parliament, the EU still lacks a strong 
direct relationship with “its” citizens and has a ways to go to resemble a 
conventional European parliamentary democracy.
49 
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
Even as the EU has emerged as an economic giant and provider of political 
stability throughout the world, it remains a “net consumer” of military se-
curity depending ultimately upon the US for protection against weapons of 
mass destruction. Like Japan, great economic and trade power creates a 
vacuum which must be filled by itself or an outside power. Thus despite 
their preoccupation with domestic economic and social issues, the EU 
countries must face their “military” deficit. They have thus begun to estab-
lish a Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP required as the EU 
emerges as a world power itself, independent to a limited degree from its 
 
49  We are indebted to Hancock et al., op. cit., passim, chs. 31-32; John Peterson (eds.), 
The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), 2002; 
Stephen George & Ian Bache, Politics in the European Union (Oxford Univ. Press), 
2001; as well as the useful though brief, John Pinder, The European Union, A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), 2001 for the above conclusions. 
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member states. The effort to create such a CFSP runs headlong into the 
gravest dilemmas of the EU: its origins as a kind of customs union
50as it 
moved from European Coal and Steel Community through its European 
Community to its current EU with a nascent executive (the Commission), a 
Parliament, a European Court of Justice, a Central European Bank and a 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, A Court of Auditors, 
an Economic and Social Committee, and a Committee of the Regions. It 
has revolutionized Europe’s currency with the introduction of the Euro un-
der the European Monetary Union. Now it has very tentatively begun to 
develop a CFSP and- most hesitantly of all- a European army of 60,000 
men. Just as a “language is a dialect with an army” so an EU without one 
remains helpless in the cruel world of international relations marked by 
“No Common Power”
51  The EU strove to negotiate a peaceful settlement 
to the first Gulf crisis which failed as many of the EU and Arab countries 
joined the US in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait. The EU’s foreign ministers 
sought to mediate a cease-fire to the Yugoslav Civil War- again with dis-
appointing results since no EU army existed or was contemplated. Finally 
the Treaty of Amsterdam empowered the EU Council (not the Commision) 
to “define the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and 
security policy, including for matters with defence implications (ital. 
added-GC). Article 13 of the Treaty. The functions of a future EU Rapid 
Reaction Force (RRF) would include peacekeeping, crisis management, 
humanitarian and rescue operations. The rotating presidency of the EU is 
assigned formal authority to represent the EU in all matters regarding 
CFSP. 
To help the presidency and the Council, the Amsterdam Treaty authorized 
the transformation of the secretary-general of the Council into the office of 
 
50  Ernst Renan in his famous 1882 Sorbonne lecture of March 11, 1882, “What is a 
Nation?” put the matter clearly: “Community of interest brings about commercial 
treaties.… a Customs Union is not a country.” Reprinted from Arend Lijphart, 
World Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.), 1966, p. 79.[bolding added-GC] 
51  Robert J. Lieber, No Common Power, Understanding International Relations, 3
rd 
Ed. (NY: HarperCollins), 1995. Lieber quotes Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, Chapter 
13: Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to 
keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war.” 
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High Representative for the CFSP. (article 18 of the Amsterdam Treaty). 
The first “High Representative” of the EU, the Spaniard Javier Solana 
Madariaga, was appointed by the EU Council in 1999. He had been Secre-
tary-General of NATO previous to his EU appointment. 
Different rules apply under the Amsterdam Treaty to military and non-
military decisions with the former generally requiring unanimity by the 
Council and the latter the QVM.
52 The difficulty for an EU military force 
(RRF) is that the member states are loathe to provide funding for it espe-
cially as it seems to weaken the most sensitive area of EU member state 
sovereignty - national defense. In addition, many of the large EU countries, 
especially Germany and France, are trying to reduce defense expenditures 
since their social welfare costs have risen to the point that they threaten to 
overprice wages and thus reduce export sales. The EU therefore to date has 
only a small army, but has recently set up a central military headquarters 
for the future RRF in Tervuren, a suburb of Brussels as part of a new de-
fense strategy. It has also deployed the RRF to the Congo in support of 
French and Uruguayan peacekeeping forces already there.
53 In a highly un-
persuasive statement in our view, President Jacques Chirac argued “We are 
not threatening the transatlantic alliance [e.g., NATO-GC]” but he is 
quoted as being unwilling to accept a bipolar world dominated by the US: 
“There is a multipolar world next to the US, with Europe and China. We 
need a strong EU to have balance,” he said.
54 But until the proposed Rapid 
 
52  For details, cf. pp., 522-23 in Hancock et al., op. cit. The EU Council agreed that 
EU armed forces would be subordinate to the Western European Union (WEU) in 
peacetime and to NATO in wartime. The Treaty of Nice in December 2000 pro-
vided for a political and security committee, a military committee, and a military 
staff within the EU to consider European crises in close consultation with NATO. 
The hope was expressed to deploy a EU military force by the middle of the decade.  
53
 “With the approval of the United Nations, France is committing troops to Congo, 
augmenting the besieged Uruguayan peacekeepers who have been providing a safe 
haven for more than 35,000 Congolese non-combatants.  The French have stated 
that they will stay until Sept. 1.By then (September 1, 2003-GC), the European un-
ion expects that its Rapid Reaction Force will have been deployed to the Congo in 
support of the French. This intervention will be the first test of the E.U.’s reaction 
force.”  Richard J. Norton, “Act now to save Congo,” The Providence Journal, 
06/12/03, p B6. 
54  Judy Dempsey in Brussels in the Financial Times of 05/30/03, pp. 1-2. “EU Leaders  
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Reaction Force of 60,000 men is fully deployed and operational, the EU is 
unlikely to be taken seriously by the US
55if then. 
In our view, the result is to make the EU a non-serious player in regional 
and world security and to increase European reliance on the US, which is 
simultaneously seen by many Europeans as an unreliable expansionist 
hegemonic power. Here again, the divide across the Atlantic seems very 
serious and both sides of the ocean have contributed by commission or 
omission. If the Germans do not wish to see Iraq rebuilt by US and UK 
military forces, they have the option of creating a joint force (RRF) with 
their French allies. At present, however, they see to want it both ways-
criticize the US and UK, but offer no military alternative themselves. 
The Military & Security Divide between the US 
and the EU 
The basic problem facing the US and the EU is that the latter recognizes 
the rise of modern political development in Europe as well as in the Arab 
and Muslim world and most of the remaining developing world. But the US 
does not. Bush and his advisers seem to have chosen the wrong epoch for 
atavistic empire-building - the age of hegemonies is over: As Karl Deutsch 
foresaw:  
 
  unveil plan for central military HQ.” Moreover, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder 
who is also reputed to be trying to repair ties with Washington noted: there was “very 
little Europe” within NATO, which Ms. Dempsey concludes was a “veiled criticism 
over US domination of the alliance.” The current Franco-German brigade would be ex-
panded to give a big push to the EU’s 60,000-strong rapid reaction force [RRF-GC] 
supposed to be operational by the middle of this year [2003-GC].” They also want to 
create a European command for strategic air transport by July—a crucial military com-
mand the EU lacks for transporting troops and humanitarian aid. European training cen-
ters for airlift and helicopter crews would also be set up to harmonise tactics.” Just how  
  this RRF could be established and at the same time defense expenditures be cut by  
  France and Germany is not clear to us. But the overall irritation by “Old Europe” for  
current US policy in Iraq seems very clear. 
55  Ibid., p. 1. Dempsey notes: “Since September 11, 2001, France. Belgium and Ger 
many have campaigned for a stronger European defence policy to give bite to Europe’s  
foreign policy and to be taken seriously by the US. So far, only France and Britain have  
begun spending more on defence.”  
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“Worldwide we are witnessing a decline of fatalism and submissiveness to dep-
rivation and oppression. The age-old mass apathy on which the old empires were 
founded is going irretrievably. We are living in an age of declining tolerance for 
frustration, for alien rule, and for government from a great distance. This is an 
age of rising costs of foreign intervention and of its declining effectiveness.” 
56 
Thus the US is confronted with rising costs of intervention combined with 
declining effectiveness. These are marked by an environmental gap already 
discussed, an economic and trade gap over US-EU issues such as subsidy 
problems in steel and agriculture (even bananas!); genetically modified 
bulk food grains; insensitivity to oil drilling in areas such as the Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and Oganiland in Nigeria; human rights 
issues (the death penalty; the ICC, US walk-out from the Durban, South 
Africa Conference on Race, etc. Whether willingly or not, the US cannot 
effectively rely on one leg for its foreign policy: the military. It cannot go it 
alone even if that were desirable for the military depends upon the eco-
nomic and political support of many countries even in the narrowest of 
senses, i.e., access to raw materials which must be imported. 
Thus for America to prosper it must return eventually to the reconstruction 
of world community especially an Atlantic Community even after damag-
ing it severely as witness the splits in NATO and growing unnecessary an-
tagonisms in US relations with South and North Korea, the Muslim world, 
Russia and China. It sometimes appears as if US policy were deliberately 
antagonizing the entire rest of the world. America and Europe must become 
partners again even as trade rivalries proliferate for both have as their bases 
the unconscious and conscious political cultures rooted in a common set of 
ideas: the vital importance of civil society and common set of human val-
ues. 
Conclusions 
We agree with Deutsch, in words easily drawn from today’s headlines or 
TV, he notes:  
 
56  Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: 
Prentice Hall, Inc.), 1978. 2
nd Ed., pp. 282-283 [bolding added-GC]. 
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“In our collective sense of belonging, we may learn to seek more for human 
solidarity and wisdom, and less for national power and prestige, more for the 
community (…). And less for the peck order of a chicken yard.”  
Deutsch concludes:  
“In world politics, we may learn to outgrow the fascination of a pseudo conser-
vatism which for thousands of years has trapped people into that futile path 
which the ancient writers of Greek tragedies called koros, the hero’s pride in 
success; hybris, tragic arrogance and overreaching and ate, the eventual mad-
ness of doom which drives the hero to rush toward self-destruction.” 
57  
As my Arab students say, “Inshallah” - may it be willed by Allah. 
 
 
57  Deutsch, op. cit., , pp. 282-283 [ital. added-GC]. 
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